

SINGAPORE STANDARD

**Industrial communication networks – Network
and system security –**

Part 2-1 : Establishing an industrial automation and
control system security program

Published by



Enterprise
Singapore

SS IEC 62443-2-1 : 2018

IEC 62443-2-1:2010, IDT
(ICS 25.040.40; 35.100.05)

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Part 2-1 : Establishing an industrial automation and control system security
program

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ISBN 978-981-48-3536-7

This Singapore Standard was approved on 15 November 2018 by the Manufacturing Standards Committee under the purview of the Singapore Standards Council.

First published, 2019.

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National Foreword

This Singapore Standard was prepared by the Working Group on Cyber Security for Industrial Automation appointed by the Technical Committee on Smart Manufacturing under the purview of the Manufacturing Standards Committee.

This standard is identical with IEC 62443-2-1:2010, "Industrial communication network – Network and system security – Part 2-1 : Establishing an industrial automation and control system security program", published by the International Electrotechnical Commission.

Where reference to a particular part of IEC 62443 is made, the appropriate Singapore Standard (which is an identical adoption of that part of IEC 62443) shall apply.

This standard is expected to be used by asset owners who can provide references to product suppliers and system integrators.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this Singapore Standard may be the subject of patent rights. Enterprise Singapore shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all of such patent rights.

NOTE

- 1. Singapore Standards (SSs) and Technical References (TRs) are reviewed periodically to keep abreast of technical changes, technological developments and industry practices. The changes are documented through the issue of either amendments or revisions.*
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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS –
NETWORK AND SYSTEM SECURITY –**

**Part 2-1: Establishing an industrial automation
and control system security program**

FOREWORD

- 1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To this end and in addition to other activities, IEC publishes International Standards, Technical Specifications, Technical Reports, Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) and Guides (hereafter referred to as “IEC Publication(s)”). Their preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested in the subject dealt with may participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-governmental organizations liaising with the IEC also participate in this preparation. IEC collaborates closely with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by agreement between the two organizations.
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International Standard IEC 62443-2-1 has been prepared by IEC technical committee 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation.

This bilingual version (2012-04) corresponds to the monolingual English version, published in 2010-11.

The text of this standard is based on the following documents:

FDIS	Report on voting
65/457/FDIS	65/461/RVD

Full information on the voting for the approval of this standard can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

The French version of this standard has not been voted upon.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all existing parts of IEC 62443 series, published under the general title *Industrial communication networks – Network and system security*, can be found on the IEC website. The full list of existing and intended parts can also be found in the Bibliography of this standard.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

NOTE The revision of this international standard will be initiated shortly after this standard is published. The next revision will be aligned more closely with ISO/IEC 27001, which addresses many of the same issues but without consideration of the specialized requirements for continuous operation and safety that are common in the industrial automation and control systems environment.

IMPORTANT – The 'colour inside' logo on the cover page of this publication indicates that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct understanding of its contents. Users should therefore print this document using a colour printer.

0 INTRODUCTION

0.1 Overview

Cyber security is an increasingly important topic in modern organizations. Many organizations involved in information technology (IT) and business have been concerned with cyber security for many years and have well-established cyber security management systems (CSMS) in place as defined by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (see ISO/IEC 17799 [23]¹ and ISO/IEC 27001 [24]). These management systems provide an organization with a well-established method for protecting its assets from cyber attacks.

Industrial automation and control system (IACS) organizations have begun using commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology developed for business systems in their everyday processes, which has provided an increased opportunity for cyber attack against the IACS equipment. These systems are not usually as robust, in the IACS environment, as are systems designed specifically as IACS at dealing with cyber attack for many reasons. This weakness may lead to health, safety and environmental (HSE) consequences.

Organizations may try to use the pre-existing IT and business cyber security solutions to address security for IACS without understanding the consequences. While many of these solutions can be applied to IACS, they need to be applied in the correct way to eliminate inadvertent consequences.

0.2 A cyber security management system for IACS

Management systems typically provide guidance on what should be included in a management system, but do not provide guidance on how to go about developing the management system. This standard addresses the aspects of the elements included in a CSMS for IACS and also provides guidance on how to go about developing the CSMS for IACS.

A very common engineering approach when faced with a challenging problem is to break the problem into smaller pieces and address each piece in a disciplined manner. This approach is a sound one for addressing cyber security risks with IACS. However, a frequent mistake made in addressing cyber security is to deal with cyber security one system at a time. Cyber security is a much larger challenge that needs to address the entire set of IACS as well as the policies, procedures, practices and personnel that surround and utilize those IACS. Implementing such a wide-ranging management system may require a cultural change within the organization.

Addressing cyber security on an organization-wide basis can seem like a daunting task. Unfortunately there is no simple cookbook for security. There is good reason for this. There is not a one-size-fits-all set of security practices. Absolute security may be achievable, but is probably undesirable because of the loss of functionality that would be necessary to achieve this near perfect state. Security is really a balance of risk versus cost. All situations will be different. In some situations the risk may be related to HSE factors rather than purely economic impact. The risk may have an unrecoverable consequence rather than a temporary financial setback. Therefore a cookbook set of mandatory security practices will either be overly restrictive and likely quite costly to follow, or be insufficient to address the risk.

¹ Numbers in square brackets refer to the Bibliography.

0.3 Relationship between this standard and ISO/IEC 17799 and ISO/IEC 27001

ISO/IEC 17799 [23] and ISO/IEC 27001 [24] are excellent standards that describe a cyber security management system for business/information technology systems. Much of the content in these standards is applicable to IACS as well. This standard emphasizes the need for consistency between the practices to manage IACS cyber security with the practices to manage business/information technology systems cyber security. Economies will be realized by making these programs consistent. Users of this standard are encouraged to read ISO/IEC 17799 and ISO/IEC 27001 for additional supporting information. This standard builds on the guidance in these ISO/IEC standards. It addresses some of the important differences between IACS and general business/information technology systems. It introduces the important concept that cyber security risks with IACS may have HSE implications and should be integrated with other existing risk management practices addressing these risks.

INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS – NETWORK AND SYSTEM SECURITY –

Part 2-1: Establishing an industrial automation and control system security program

1 Scope

This part of IEC 62443 defines the elements necessary to establish a cyber security management system (CSMS) for industrial automation and control systems (IACS) and provides guidance on how to develop those elements. This standard uses the broad definition and scope of what constitutes an IACS described in IEC/TS 62443-1-1.

The elements of a CSMS described in this standard are mostly policy, procedure, practice and personnel related, describing what shall or should be included in the final CSMS for the organization.

NOTE 1 Other documents in the IEC 62443 series and in the Bibliography discuss specific technologies and/or solutions for cyber security in more detail.

The guidance provided on how to develop a CSMS is an example. It represents the author's opinion on how an organization could go about developing the elements and may not work in all situations. The users of this standard will have to read the requirements carefully and apply the guidance appropriately in order to develop a fully functioning CSMS for an organization. The policies and procedures discussed in this standard should be tailored to fit within the organization.

NOTE 2 There may be cases where a pre-existing CSMS is in place and the IACS portion is being added or there may be some organizations that have never formally created a CSMS at all. The authors of this standard cannot anticipate all cases where an organization will be establishing a CSMS for the IACS environment, so this standard does not attempt to create a solution for all cases.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC/TS 62443-1-1² – *Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 1-1: Terminology, concepts and models*

² This standard is derived from ANSI/ISA 99.02.01:2009 and wholly replaces it for international use. It is intended that the second edition of IEC/TS 62443-1-1 be an International Standard, not a TS, after inclusion of some normative requirements to which conformance is possible.