TR IEC/TR 62443-3-1:2018(2024)

IEC/TR 62443-3-1:2009, IDT (ICS 25.040.40; 33.040.40; 35.040)

TECHNICAL REFERENCE

Industrial communication networks – Network and system security

 Part 3-1 : Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems

Confirmed 2024





TR IEC/TR 62443-3-1:2018(2024)

IEC/TR 62443-3-1:2009, IDT (ICS 25.040.40; 33.040.40; 35.040)

TECHNICAL REFERENCE

Industrial communication networks – Network and system security

Part 3-1 : Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems

Published by Enterprise Singapore



THIS PUBLICATION IS COPYRIGHT PROTECTED Copyright © 2018 Enterprise Singapore Copyright © 2009 IEC, Geneva, Switzerland

All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from Enterprise Singapore, representing the IEC National Committee of Singapore, or the IEC. If you have any questions about the copyrights of Enterprise Singapore or the IEC or have an enquiry about obtaining additional rights to this publication, please contact Enterprise Singapore at: standards@enterprisesg.gov.sg for further information.

TR IEC/TR 62443-3-1:2018(2024)

National Foreword

This Technical Reference (TR) was prepared by the Working Group on Cyber Security for Industrial Automation set up by the Technical Committee on Smart Manufacturing under the purview of the Manufacturing Standards Committee.

This TR is an identical adoption of IEC/TR 62443-3-1:2009, "Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3-1 : Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems", published by the International Electrotechnical Commission.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this TR may be the subject of patent rights. Enterprise Singapore shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all of such patent rights.

NOTE

- Singapore Standards (SSs) and Technical References (TRs) are reviewed periodically to keep abreast of technical changes, technological developments and industry practices. The changes are documented through the issue of either amendments or revisions. Where SSs are deemed to be stable, i.e. no foreseeable changes in them, they will be classified as "mature standards". Mature standards will not be subject to further review, unless there are requests to review such standards.
- 2. An SS or TR is voluntary in nature except when it is made mandatory by a regulatory authority. It can also be cited in contracts making its application a business necessity. Users are advised to assess and determine whether the SS or TR is suitable for their intended use or purpose. If required, they should refer to the relevant professionals or experts for advice on the use of the document. Enterprise Singapore and the Singapore Standards Council shall not be liable for any damages whether directly or indirectly suffered by anyone or any organisation as a result of the use of any SS or TR. Although care has been taken to draft this standard, users are also advised to ensure that they apply the information after due diligence.
- 3. Compliance with a SS or TR does not exempt users from any legal obligations.





Edition 1.0 2009-07

TECHNICAL REPORT



Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3-1: Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems





THIS PUBLICATION IS COPYRIGHT PROTECTED

Copyright © 2009 IEC, Geneva, Switzerland

All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from either IEC or IEC's member National Committee in the country of the requester.

If you have any questions about IEC copyright or have an enquiry about obtaining additional rights to this publication, please contact the address below or your local IEC member National Committee for further information.

Droits de reproduction réservés. Sauf indication contraire, aucune partie de cette publication ne peut être reproduite ni utilisée sous quelque forme que ce soit et par aucun procédé, électronique ou mécanique, y compris la photocopie et les microfilms, sans l'accord écrit de la CEI ou du Comité national de la CEI du pays du demandeur. Si vous avez des questions sur le copyright de la CEI ou si vous désirez obtenir des droits supplémentaires sur cette publication, utilisez les coordonnées ci-après ou contactez le Comité national de la CEI de votre pays de résidence.

IEC Central Office 3, rue de Varembé CH-1211 Geneva 20 Switzerland Email: inmail@iec.ch Web: www.iec.ch

About IEC publications

The technical content of IEC publications is kept under constant review by the IEC. Please make sure that you have the latest edition, a corrigenda or an amendment might have been published.

Catalogue of IEC publications: <u>www.iec.ch/searchpub</u>

The IEC on-line Catalogue enables you to search by a variety of criteria (reference number, text, technical committee,...). It also gives information on projects, withdrawn and replaced publications.

IEC Just Published: <u>www.iec.ch/online_news/justpub</u>

Stay up to date on all new IEC publications. Just Published details twice a month all new publications released. Available on-line and also by email.

Electropedia: <u>www.electropedia.org</u>

The world's leading online dictionary of electronic and electrical terms containing more than 20 000 terms and definitions in English and French, with equivalent terms in additional languages. Also known as the International Electrotechnical Vocabulary online.

Customer Service Centre: <u>www.iec.ch/webstore/custserv</u>

If you wish to give us your feedback on this publication or need further assistance, please visit the Customer Service Centre FAQ or contact us:

Email: <u>csc@iec.ch</u> Tel.: +41 22 919 02 11 Fax: +41 22 919 03 00





Edition 1.0 2009-07

TECHNICAL REPORT



Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3 1: Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems

INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION



ICS 25.040.40; 33.040.040; 35.040

ISBN 978-2-88910-711-7

CONTENTS

FO	REWO	ORD		8	
INT	ROD		۷	10	
1	Scope			12	
2	Normative references			13	
3	Term	Terms, definitions and acronyms			
	3.1		and definitions		
	3.2		yms		
4	Over	view	·	21	
5	Auth	enticati	on and authorization technologies	22	
	5.1	General			
	5.2	Role-based authorization tools			
		5.2.1	Overview	23	
		5.2.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	23	
		5.2.3	Typical deployment	24	
		5.2.4	Known issues and weaknesses	24	
		5.2.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	25	
		5.2.6	Future directions	25	
		5.2.7	Recommendations and guidance	25	
		5.2.8	Information sources and reference material	25	
	5.3	Passw	vord authentication	25	
		5.3.1	Overview	25	
		5.3.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	26	
		5.3.3	Typical deployment	26	
		5.3.4	Known issues and weaknesses	26	
		5.3.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	27	
		5.3.6	Future directions	27	
		5.3.7	Recommendations and guidance	28	
		5.3.8	Information sources and reference material		
	5.4	Challe	enge/response authentication	28	
		5.4.1	Overview		
		5.4.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology		
		5.4.3	Typical deployment		
		5.4.4	Known issues and weaknesses	29	
		5.4.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment		
		5.4.6	Future directions		
		5.4.7	Recommendations and guidance		
		5.4.8	Information sources and reference material		
	5.5		cal/token authentication		
		5.5.1	Overview		
		5.5.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology		
		5.5.3	Typical deployment		
		5.5.4	Known issues and weaknesses	31	
		5.5.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	31	

TR 62443-3-1 © IEC:2009(E)

	5.5.6	Future directions	31
	5.5.7	Recommendations and guidance	31
	5.5.8	Information sources and reference material	32
5.6	Smart	card authentication	32
	5.6.1	Overview	32
	5.6.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	32
	5.6.3	Typical deployment	32
	5.6.4	Known issues and weaknesses	33
	5.6.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	33
	5.6.6	Future directions	33
	5.6.7	Recommendations and guidance	33
	5.6.8	Information sources and reference material	34
5.7	Biome	tric authentication	34
	5.7.1	Overview	34
	5.7.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	34
	5.7.3	Typical deployment	34
	5.7.4	Known issues and weaknesses	34
	5.7.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	35
	5.7.6	Future directions	35
	5.7.7	Recommendations and guidance	35
	5.7.8	Information sources and reference material	35
5.8	Locatio	on-based authentication	35
	5.8.1	Overview	35
	5.8.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	36
	5.8.3	Typical deployment	36
	5.8.4	Known issues and weaknesses	36
	5.8.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	36
	5.8.6	Future directions	36
	5.8.7	Recommendations and guidance	36
	5.8.8	Information sources and reference material	37
5.9	Passw	ord distribution and management technologies	37
	5.9.1	Overview	37
	5.9.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	37
	5.9.3	Typical deployment	37
	5.9.4	Known issues and weaknesses	37
	5.9.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	38
	5.9.6	Future directions	38
	5.9.7	Recommendations and guidance	39
	5.9.8	Information sources and reference material	39
5.10	Device	e-to-device authentication	39
	5.10.1	Overview	39
	5.10.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	40
	5.10.3	Typical deployment	40
	5.10.4	Known issues and weaknesses	40
	5.10.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	40

		5.10.6	Future directions	40
		5.10.7	Recommendations and guidance	41
		5.10.8	Information sources and reference material	41
6	Filter	ing/bloc	king/access control technologies	41
	6.1	Genera	al	41
	6.2		rk firewalls	
	-	6.2.1	Overview	
		6.2.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	
		6.2.3	Typical deployment	
		6.2.4	Known issues and weaknesses	
		6.2.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems	40
		6.2.6	environment Future directions	-
		6.2.7	Recommendations and guidance	
		6.2.8	Information sources and reference material	
	6.3		ased firewalls	
	0.5	6.3.1	Overview	
		6.3.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	
		6.3.3	Typical deployment	
		6.3.4	Known issues and weaknesses	
		6.3.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems	45
		0.3.5	environment	46
		6.3.6	Future directions	
		6.3.7	Recommendations and guidance	
		6.3.8	Information sources and reference material	
	6.4	Virtual	Networks	47
		6.4.1	Overview	
		6.4.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	48
		6.4.3	Known issues and weaknesses	48
		6.4.4	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	10
		6.4.5		
		6.4.6	Recommendations and guidance	
		6.4.7	Information sources and reference material	
7	Encry	••••	echnologies and data validation	
'	7.1			
	7.1 7.2		al	
	1.2	7.2.1	etric (secret) key encryption Overview	
		7.2.1	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	
		7.2.2	Typical deployment	
		7.2.3	Known issues and weaknesses	
		7.2.4	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems	
		-	environment	
		7.2.6	Future directions	
		7.2.7	Recommendations and guidance	
		7.2.8	Information sources and reference material	
	7.3		key encryption and key distribution	
		7.3.1	Overview	
		7.3.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	
		7.3.3	Typical deployment	54

8.5

8.5.1

TR	62443	8-3-1 ©	IEC:2009(E) – 5 –			
		7.3.4	Known issues and weaknesses			
		7.3.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems			
			environment			
		7.3.6	Future directions			
		7.3.7	Problems of encryption usage			
		7.3.8	Information sources and reference material			
	7.4	Virtual	private networks (VPNs)			
		7.4.1	Overview			
		7.4.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology			
		7.4.3	Typical deployment			
		7.4.4	Known issues and weaknesses			
		7.4.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment			
		7.4.6	Future directions			
		7.4.7	Recommendations and guidance			
		7.4.8	Information sources and reference material			
8	Mana	gement	, audit, measurement, monitoring, and detection tools			
	8.1	Genera	al			
	8.2		diting utilities			
		8.2.1	Overview			
		8.2.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology			
		8.2.3	Typical deployment			
		8.2.4	Known issues and weaknesses			
		8.2.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment			
		8.2.6	Future directions			
		8.2.7	Recommendations and guidance			
		8.2.8	Information sources and reference material			
	8.3	Virus and malicious code detection systems				
			Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology			
		8.3.2	Typical deployment			
		8.3.3	Known issues and weaknesses			
		8.3.4	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment			
		8.3.5	Cost range			
		8.3.6	Future directions			
		8.3.7	Recommendations and guidance			
		8.3.8	Information sources and reference material			
	8.4	Intrusic	on detection systems (IDS)			
		8.4.1	Overview			
		8.4.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology			
		8.4.3	Typical deployment			
		8.4.4	Known issues and weaknesses			
		8.4.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment			
		8.4.6	Future directions			
		8.4.7	Recommendations and guidance			

8.4.8Information sources and reference material68Vulnerability scanners69

		8.5.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	69
		8.5.3	Typical deployment	70
		8.5.4	Known issues and weaknesses	70
		8.5.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	70
		8.5.6	Future directions	
		8.5.7	Recommendations and guidance	71
		8.5.8	Information sources and reference material	
	8.6	Forens	ics and analysis tools (FAT)	71
		8.6.1	Overview	
		8.6.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	72
		8.6.3	Typical deployment	72
		8.6.4	Known issues and weaknesses	72
		8.6.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	73
		8.6.6	Future directions	73
		8.6.7	Recommendations and guidance	74
		8.6.8	Information sources and reference material	74
	8.7	Host co	onfiguration management tools (HCM)	74
		8.7.1	Overview	74
		8.7.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	74
		8.7.3	Typical deployment	71 72 72 72 72 73 73 73 74 74 74 74 74 74 75 75 75 75 76 76 76 76 77 77 77 77 77 77 78 78 78 78 78
		8.7.4	Known issues and weaknesses	75
		8.7.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	75
		8.7.6	Future directions	
		8.7.7	Recommendations and guidance	
		8.7.8	Information sources and reference material	
	8.8		ated software management tools (ASM)	76
		8.8.1	Overview	
		8.8.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	
		8.8.3	Typical deployment	77
		8.8.4	Known issues and weaknesses	77
		8.8.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	77
		8.8.6	Future directions	78
		8.8.7	Recommendations and guidance	78
		8.8.8	Information sources and reference material	78
9	Indus	trial aut	omation and control systems computer software	78
	9.1	Genera	11	78
	9.2	Server	and workstation operating systems	79
		9.2.1	Overview	79
		9.2.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	79
		9.2.3	Typical deployment	79
		9.2.4	Known issues and weaknesses	79
		9.2.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	80
		9.2.6	Future directions	80
		9.2.7	Recommendations and guidance	80
		9.2.8	Information sources and reference material	81

	9.3		me and embedded operating systems	
		9.3.1	Overview	
		9.3.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	
		9.3.3	Typical deployment	
		9.3.4	Known issues and weaknesses	82
		9.3.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	00
		9.3.6	Future directions	
		9.3.7	Recommendations and guidance	
		9.3.8	Information sources and reference material	
	9.4	0.0.0	chnologies	
	9.4	9.4.1	Overview	
		9.4.1	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	
		9.4.2 9.4.3	Typical deployment	
		9.4.3 9.4.4	Known issues and weaknesses	
		9.4.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems	00
		3.4.5	environment	83
		9.4.6	Future directions	84
		9.4.7	Recommendations and guidance	84
		9.4.8	Information sources and reference material	
10	Phys	ical sec	urity controls	
	-		۶ al	
			al protection	
		•	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	
			Typical deployment	
			Known issues and weaknesses	
			Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems	
			environment	86
		10.2.5	Future directions	87
		10.2.6	Recommendations and guidance	87
		10.2.7	Information sources and reference material	88
	10.3	Persor	nel security	88
		10.3.1	Overview	88
		10.3.2	Security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology	88
		10.3.3	Typical deployment	89
		10.3.4	Known issues and weaknesses	90
		10.3.5	Assessment of use in the industrial automation and control systems environment	
		10.3.6	Future directions	
			Recommendations and guidance	
			Information sources and reference material	
Ann	ex A		ative) Trade name declarations	
		-		
וטוט	iogra	priy		90
Figu	iro 1	_ Firew	all zone separation	10
Figl	Figure 2 – Security gateway to security gateway VPN57			

INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS – NETWORK AND SYSTEM SECURITY –

Part 3-1: Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems

FOREWORD

- 1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To this end and in addition to other activities, IEC publishes International Standards, Technical Specifications, Technical Reports, Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) and Guides (hereafter referred to as "IEC Publication(s)"). Their preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested in the subject dealt with may participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-governmental organizations liaising with the IEC also participate in this preparation. IEC collaborates closely with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by agreement between the two organizations.
- The formal decisions or agreements of IEC on technical matters express, as nearly as possible, an international consensus of opinion on the relevant subjects since each technical committee has representation from all interested IEC National Committees.
- 3) IEC Publications have the form of recommendations for international use and are accepted by IEC National Committees in that sense. While all reasonable efforts are made to ensure that the technical content of IEC Publications is accurate, IEC cannot be held responsible for the way in which they are used or for any misinterpretation by any end user.
- 4) In order to promote international uniformity, IEC National Committees undertake to apply IEC Publications transparently to the maximum extent possible in their national and regional publications. Any divergence between any IEC Publication and the corresponding national or regional publication shall be clearly indicated in the latter.
- 5) IEC provides no marking procedure to indicate its approval and cannot be rendered responsible for any equipment declared to be in conformity with an IEC Publication.
- 6) All users should ensure that they have the latest edition of this publication.
- 7) No liability shall attach to IEC or its directors, employees, servants or agents including individual experts and members of its technical committees and IEC National Committees for any personal injury, property damage or other damage of any nature whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, or for costs (including legal fees) and expenses arising out of the publication, use of, or reliance upon, this IEC Publication or any other IEC Publications.
- 8) Attention is drawn to the Normative references cited in this publication. Use of the referenced publications is indispensable for the correct application of this publication.
- 9) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this IEC Publication may be the subject of patent rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

The main task of IEC technical committees is to prepare International Standards. However, a technical committee may propose the publication of a technical report when it has collected data of a different kind from that which is normally published as an International Standard, for example "state of the art".

IEC 62443-3-1, which is a technical report, has been prepared by IEC technical committee 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation.

This technical report is closely related to ANSI/ISA-TR99.03.01-2007.

TR 62443-3-1 © IEC:2009(E)

The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:

Enquiry draft	Report on voting
65/424/DTR	65/431A/RVC

Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all parts of IEC 62443 series, published under the general title *Industrial communication networks – Network and system security*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the maintenance result date indicated on the IEC web site under http://webstore.iec.ch in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be:

- reconfirmed;
- withdrawn;
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

NOTE The revision of this technical report will be synchronized with the other parts of the IEC 62443 series.

IMPORTANT – The "colour inside" logo on the cover page of this publication indicates that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct understanding of its contents. Users should therefore print this publication using a colour printer.

– 10 –

INTRODUCTION

The need for protecting Industrial Automation and Control System (IACS) computer environments from malicious cyberintrusions has grown significantly over the last decade. The combination of the increased use of open systems, platforms, and protocols in the IACS environment, along with an increase in joint ventures, alliance partners and outsourcing, has lead to increased threats and a higher probability of cyberattacks. As these threats and vulnerabilities increase, the risk of a cyberattack on an industrial communication network correspondingly increases, as well as the need for protection of computer and networkedbased information sharing and analysis centres. Additionally, the growth in intelligent equipment and embedded systems; increased connectivity to computer and networked equipment and software; and enhanced external connectivity coupled with rapidly increasing incidents of network intrusion, more intelligent hackers, and malicious yet easily accessible software, all add to the risk as well.

There are numerous electronic security technologies and cyberintrusion countermeasures potentially available to the IACS environment. This technical report addresses several categories of cybersecurity technologies and countermeasure techniques and discusses specific types of applications within each category, the vulnerabilities addressed by each type, suggestions for their deployment, and their known strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, guidance is provided for using the various categories of security technologies and countermeasure techniques and weaknesses.

This technical report does not make recommendations of one cybersecurity technology or mitigation method over others, but provides suggestions and guidance for using the technologies and methods, as well as information to consider when developing a site or corporate cybersecurity policy, program and procedures for the IACS environment.

The responsible standards development working group intends to update this technical report periodically to reflect new information, cybersecurity technologies, countermeasures, and cyberrisk mitigation methods. The committee cautions the reader that following the recommended guidance in this report will not necessarily ensure that optimized cybersecurity is attained for the reader's industrial automation or control systems environment. It will, however, help to identify and address vulnerabilities, and to reduce the risk of undesired cyberintrusions that could compromise confidential information or, even worse, cause human and environmental harm, as well as disruption or failure of the industrial network or control systems and the industry and infrastructure critical assets they monitor and regulate.

This technical report provides an evaluation and assessment of many current types of electronic-based cybersecurity technologies, mitigation methods and tools that may apply to protecting the IACS environment from detrimental cyberintrusions and attacks. For the various technologies, methods and tools introduced in this report, a discussion of their development, implementation, operations, maintenance, engineering and other user services is provided. The report also provides guidance to manufacturers, vendors, and security practitioners at end-user companies, facilities, and industries on the technological options and countermeasures for securing automated IACSs (and their associated industrial networks) against electronic (cyber) attack.

Following the recommended guidance given in this technical report will not necessarily ensure that optimized cybersecurity is attained for IACSs. It will, however, help to identify and address vulnerabilities, and to reduce the risk of undesired intrusions that could compromise confidential information or cause disruption or failure of control systems and the critical infrastructure assets they automate and control. Of more concern, use of the recommendations may aid in reducing the risk of any human or environmental harm that may result after the cyber compromise of an automated control system or its associated industrial network.

The cybersecurity guidance presented in this document is general in nature, and should be applied to each control system or network as appropriate by personnel knowledgeable in TR 62443-3-1 © IEC:2009(E) - 11 -

those specific industrial automation or control systems to which it is being applied. The guidance identifies those activities and actions that are typically important to provide cybersecure control systems, but whose application is not always compatible with effective operation or maintenance of a system's functions. The guidance includes suggestions and recommendations on appropriate cybersecurity applications to specific control systems. However, selection and deployment of particular cybersecurity activities and practices for a given control system and its related industrial network is the responsibility of the system's owner.

It is intended that this guidance will mature and be modified over time, as experience is gained with control system vulnerabilities, as specific cybersecurity implementations mature, and as new control-based cybersecurity technologies become available. As such, while the general format of this guidance is expected to remain relatively stable, the specifics of its application and solutions are expected to evolve.

INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS – NETWORK AND SYSTEM SECURITY –

Part 3-1: Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems

1 Scope

This part of IEC 62443 provides a current assessment of various cybersecurity tools, mitigation counter-measures, and technologies that may effectively apply to the modern electronically based IACSs regulating and monitoring numerous industries and critical infrastructures. It describes several categories of control system-centric cybersecurity technologies, the types of products available in those categories, the pros and cons of using those products in the automated IACS environments, relative to the expected threats and known cyber vulnerabilities, and, most important, the preliminary recommendations and guidance for using these cybersecurity technology products and/or countermeasures.

The concept of IACS cybersecurity as applied in this technical report is in the broadest possible sense, encompassing all types of components, plants, facilities, and systems in all industries and critical infrastructures. IACSs include, but are not limited to:

- Hardware (e.g., data historian servers) and software systems (e.g., operating platforms, configurations, applications) such as Distributed Control Systems (DCSs), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, networked electronic sensing systems, and monitoring, diagnostic, and assessment systems. Inclusive in this hardware and software domain is the essential industrial network and any connected or related information technology (IT) devices and links critical to the successful operation to the control system at large. As such, this domain also includes, but is not limited to: firewalls, servers, routers, switches, gateways, fieldbus systems, intrusion detection systems, intelligent electronic/end devices, remote terminal units (RTUs), and both wired and wireless remote modems.
- Associated internal, human, network, or machine interfaces used to provide control, data logging, diagnostics, safety, monitoring, maintenance, quality assurance, regulatory compliance, auditing and other types of operational functionality for either continuous, batch, discrete, and combined processes.

Similarly, the concept of cybersecurity technologies and countermeasures is also broadly applied in this technical report and includes, but is not limited to, the following technologies:

- authentication and authorization;
- filtering, blocking, and access control;
- encryption;
- data validation;
- auditing;
- measurement;
- monitoring and detection tools;
- operating systems.

In addition, a non-cyber technology —physical security control— is an essential requirement for some aspects of cybersecurity and is discussed in this technical report.

The purpose of this technical report is to categorize and define cybersecurity technologies, countermeasures, and tools currently available to provide a common basis for later technical